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Posted by: Zachary Hall

The following is a summary of selected criminal opinions issued by the Third Court of Appeals from October 2025. The summary is an overview; please review the entire opinions. The subsequent history is current as of May 11, 2026.

SEARCH WARRANTS: Requirement that affidavit be “sworn”.

State v. Chavez, 729 S.W.3d 391 (Tex. App.—Austin 2025, no pet.). Trial court did not abuse its discretion by suppressing blood-draw evidence after concluding that search-warrant affidavit was unsworn. Chavez, who was charged with a DWI offense, filed a motion to suppress blood-draw evidence obtained through a search warrant, arguing that the arresting officer’s probable-cause affidavit in support of the warrant had not been sworn or made under oath. The evidence at the hearing established that the officer completed the search warrant application inside her patrol car and electronically signed the affidavit. The affidavit was notarized by another officer, with whom the arresting officer spoke by telephone during the affidavit’s preparation. The arresting officer testified “at no time” did “anyone ever put [her] under oath” or “ask [her] if everything in any of those affidavits was true and correct.” The other officer testified that she did not place the arresting officer under oath and only “asked her to sign in the correct position stating that she was the one swearing to it.” The district court granted the motion to suppress and the appellate court affirmed. The court explained that an officer’s failure to swear to the facts in her affidavit “renders defective any search warrant issued on the basis of the unsworn probable-cause affidavit,” and that swearing an oath or affirmation is not the same as signing an affidavit. In determining the existence of a sworn oath, courts consider whether the affiant was “impressed with the magnitude of the act and whether the swearing occurred with sufficient solemnity and gravity.” In this case, the record supported the trial court’s finding that no oath or affirmation was sworn and that the circumstances surrounding the officer’s signing of the affidavit lacked solemnity and gravity. The court rejected the State’s assertion that being subject to criminal liability for perjury was a “test” for finding the existence of a sworn oath. Additionally, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because “a reasonable officer would have known that the search warrant in this case was invalid because a sworn affidavit was not filed, and there was no oath or affirmation.” Therefore, suppression was proper.  

REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS: Motions for new trial and confrontation rights.

State v. Navarro, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 03-23-00637-CR (Tex. App.—Austin 2025, pet. filed). Sixth Amendment right to confrontation did not apply to community-supervision revocation hearing. Navarro was placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision. The State later filed a motion to revoke Navarro’s community supervision and to adjudicate his guilt. The trial court granted the motion, revoked Navarro’s community supervision, and adjudicated him guilty of the offense. The trial court sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment but announced its intent to place him on “shock probation.” Navarro filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court granted. The trial court stated that it was granting a new trial because Navarro was not eligible for probation. This ground was not raised in Navarro’s motion for new trial, and the State objected to granting a new trial on that basis. 

The appellate court reversed. First, the court concluded that, because Navarro did not raise the issue of his ineligibility for shock probation in his motion for new trial, and the State objected to granting a new trial on that basis, the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial on that ground. The court then proceeded to consider the merits of the grounds raised in Navarro’s motion, including his contention that he was denied his right of confrontation. One of the State’s witnesses had testified that Navarro had missed multiple probation appointments, including one with a former probation officer who did not testify at the hearing. The witness testified to entries in Navarro’s probation records made by the officer who was unavailable to testify. Assuming without deciding that this amounted to a confrontation violation, the court held that “a deferred-adjudication community-supervision revocation hearing is not a stage in a criminal prosecution at which the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation applies.” The court explained that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals “has not determined whether the Confrontation Clause applies in hearings on motions to adjudicate guilt or to probation-revocation proceedings more broadly” and that there were significant differences between revocation proceedings and criminal trials. Because of those differences, other intermediate appellate courts had concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation did not apply to revocation hearings, and the court followed those courts. 

Posted by: Laurie Ratliff

Laurie Ratliff is a former staff attorney  for the Third Court of Appeals. She is  board-certified in civil appellate law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization and owner of Laurie Ratliff LLC. 

 

The following are summaries of selected civil opinions issued by the Third Court of Appeals during April 2026. The summaries are an overview; please review the entire opinion. Subsequent histories are current as of May 8, 2026. 

MANDAMUS: Court grants relief for grandparent-access order signed after plenary power expired. 

In re B.W.A., No. 03-25-00931-CV (Tex. App.—Austin April 1, 2026, orig. proceeding). Relators, adoptive parents of two minor children, signed a master service agreement (MSA) in 2017 giving biological Grandparents (real parties in interest) access. No order was entered on the MSA. Ultimately, Relators denied Grandparents visitation. In 2025, Grandparents filed a modification proceeding seeking a judgment on the MSA. The trial court denied Relators’ plea to the jurisdiction and entered an order granting Grandparent access. The court of appeals concluded that, without the MSA, Grandparents lacked standing under Family Code Section 153.434 because biological mother relinquished her parental rights and biological father was deceased. Execution of the MSA, without an order on it, was not a request for possession and access. The adoption order was signed Feb. 16, 2018. Thus, plenary power ended 30 days later. Because the trial court signed the Grandparent-access order after plenary power expired, the order was void. The court granted mandamus relief. 

MANDAMUS: Court grants relief where trial court denied production of tax returns.

In re Johnson, No. 03-26-00121-CV (Tex. App.—Austin April 9, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). In this family law matter, Mother sought above-guidelines support and requested production of Father’s unredacted tax returns. Father claimed to have investments worth between $1 million and $50 million but refused to give any specifics. The trial court denied Mother’s motion to compel. On mandamus, the court of appeals held that Family Code Section 154.063’s requirement for production of tax returns is mandatory. Additionally, Father’s tax returns were relevant for the trial court to allocate the responsibility to meet the child’s needs between the parties. The court held the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to compel. The court rejected Father’s laches argument. Mother waited almost two months to seek mandamus relief. The court granted relief. 

TRIAL PROCEDURE: Court reverses dismissal under Rule 91a in private nuisance lawsuit.

Clements v. McBroom, No. 03-25-00442-CV (Tex. App.—Austin April 9, 2026, no pet. h.). Appellants (“Landowners”) sued McBrooms for private nuisance seeking injunctive relief to halt construction of a battery energy storage system (BESS) on McBrooms’ property. Landowners’ contended McBrooms were negligent by not having a court-approved hazard- mitigation plan for a high-risk industrial property. Landowners’ alleged that BESS relies on lithium-ion batteries, which are prone to thermal runaway fires; Fayette County lacks emergency-response infrastructure for handling such fires; and that Landowners’ properties were within a mile of the proposed site. The trial court dismissed Landowners’ lawsuit under Rule 91a and awarded attorney’s fees. According to the court of appeals, Landowners stated a negligence cause of action and asserted a legal injury of private nuisance. Landowners’ allegations, if proven, support injunctive relief given the imminent actions taken to construct the BESS without a hazard-mitigation plan. The court reversed and remanded. 

ATTORNEY’S FEES: Court reverses fee award based on overly redacted billing records. 

Nunez v. Nichols, No. 03-24-00263-CV (Tex. App.—Austin April 30, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). The trial court ordered Father to pay support for an adult child with disabilities and to pay Mother’s attorney’s fees. Attorney testified to hourly rates and introduced redacted billing records, offering to provide the court an unredacted copy. Father did not request in-camera review of the unredacted bills. According to the court of appeals, the “determinative factor is whether the bills provide sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s exercise of discretion, regardless of how much or little they were redacted.” The redactions eliminated information that would allow Father to challenge the reasonableness of the fees. The court rejected Mother’s argument that the offer to provide the court with unredacted copies mooted Father’s complaint. The court reversed and remanded the attorney’s-fees issue.  

Posted by: Ari Cuenin

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Court deems ban on home distilling operations unconstitutional.

McNutt v. U.S. D.O.J. (5th Cir. No. 24-10760). The Fifth Circuit held unconstitutional the federal prohibition on home distillation of consumable spirits, concluding that 26 U.S.C. § 5178(a)(1)(B) and § 5601(a)(6) exceeded Congress’s powers under the Taxation and Necessary and Proper Clauses. 

The court first held the plaintiffs had standing based on credible threats of enforcement, including prior warnings issued by federal regulators. On the merits, the opinion acknowledged Congress’s longstanding authority to tax distilled spirits but concluded the categorical residential-distillation ban swept beyond what was necessary to support tax collection. Although the government argued the statute prevented tax evasion and protected revenue, the ban was not a valid exercise of the taxing power because it did not raise revenue, instead preventing taxable spirits from coming into existence and criminalizing conduct outright. Without a “limiting principle” to the government’s argument, the statutes merely functioned as an impermissible federal police regulation rather than a revenue-collection regime. 

QUI TAM: Court rejects False Claims Act based on “reverse false claims” theory.

United States ex rel. Palmer v. Tata Consulting Services, Ltd. (5th Cir. No. 25-40368). The Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a qui tam action alleging that Tata made “reverse false claims” under the False Claims Act (FCA) by fraudulently obtaining cheaper visa classifications and underpaying foreign workers. The relator alleged Tata improperly used B-1 and L-1A visas instead of more expensive H-1B visas to avoid higher visa fees and payroll-tax obligations.

The allegations failed because the FCA requires an established, present “obligation to pay or transmit money” to the government. Tata never applied for H-1B visas, so it had no legal obligation to pay H-1B-related fees. Likewise, although Tata allegedly underpaid workers in violation of immigration regulations, the FCA does not convert hypothetical wage obligations into tax obligations on wages never actually paid.

Thus, even assuming visa fraud occurred, liability attaches only when a false claim deprives the government of money or property. The panel repeatedly distinguished underlying misconduct from actionable FCA claims, reinforcing the Fifth Circuit’s insistence on payment obligations that are established and present, not merely potential or contingent.

MANDAMUS: Panel finds that district court misapplied court-congestion factor in Section 1404(a) transfer analysis.

In re Google LLC (5th Cir. No. 25-40788). The Fifth Circuit granted mandamus and ordered transfer of an antitrust case from the Eastern District of Texas to the Northern District of California, concluding the district court misapplied 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)’s transfer factors. Branch Metrics sued Google in Texas based largely on evidence developed in prior federal antitrust litigation. Google sought transfer to California, where most sources of proof were located.

Over Judge Higginson’s dissent, the majority held the district court erred by treating court-congestion statistics as weighing against transfer in a complex case. Such metrics are speculative and particularly unreliable in discovery-intensive litigation, and the court effectively allowed that single factor to override the other factors, which either favored transfer or were neutral. The majority opinion thus reflects that plaintiffs may strategically select favorable fora, but judges must faithfully apply transfer doctrine without allowing docket-speed considerations to trump other factors. And Clayton Act claims warrant no heightened deference.

FIRST AMENDMENT: En Banc Fifth Circuit upholds Ten Commandments classroom display.

Nathan v. Alamo Heights ISD (5th Cir. No. 25-50695). The en banc Court upheld Texas S.B. 10, which requires public-school classrooms to display the Ten Commandments, vacating a preliminary injunction entered on Establishment Clause and Free Exercise grounds. Importantly, the court found the Texas statute ripe for review because it prescribed a uniform display requirement, unlike a similar Louisiana law previously dismissed as unripe. Judge Duncan’s majority opinion held that modern Establishment Clause analysis is governed by the historical-tradition framework articulated in Kennedy v. Bremerton. The Supreme Court’s earlier Stone v. Graham precedent, depending on the now-abrogated Lemon test, no longer controlled.

The court rejected a Free Exercise challenge, distinguishing Mahmoud v. Taylor on the grounds that S.B. 10 does not create a coercive religious curriculum, authorize proselytizing, or require students to affirm or practice religion. The majority thus framed the dispositive merits question as whether S.B. 10 resembles a founding-era “establishment of religion.” Surveying historical practices, the majority concluded that religious establishments historically involved coercive features like mandatory worship, taxation supporting clergy, punishment of dissenters, or governmental control over doctrine. S.B. 10 did none of those things. Nathan signals historical coercion—not mere religious content—as a key consideration of future Establishment Clause analyses in the Fifth Circuit.  

Join the Austin Bar's LGBTQ+ Law Section for the Austin Pride Parade!

Date: Saturday, Aug. 22, 2026

Time: 7:30 p.m.

Location: TBA

RSVP here.

Join us for summer law clerk social co-hosted by AYLA and the Austin Bar Association.

Date: Thursday, June 18

Time: 5:30 - 7 p.m.

Location: Mean Eyed Cat, 1621 W. 5th St

Sponsored by Planet Depos & Broadway Bank

RSVP here

The Texas Metro Bars will present a free CLE on Texas' new summary judgment rule and best practices for trial.

Date: Thursday, May 28

Time: 12 - 1 p.m.

Location: Zoom

Speakers: Judge Antonia Arteaga, Judge Rabeea Collier, Judge Jennifer Edgeworth, Judge Amy Clark Meachum, Judge Melody Wilkinson, Judge Martin Hoffman (moderator)

MCLE: 1.00 general credit, 0.25 ethics

RSVP here.

AYLA will host a CLE on building confidence for early-career lawyers with special guest speakers Nadia Bettac and Lauren Aldredge.

Date: Wednesday, June 24

Time: 12 - 1 p.m. 

Location: McGinnis Lochridge, 1111 W. 6th Street, Suite 400, Bldg. B

Sponsored by Bettac Advocacy & Mediation and Cokinos Young.

RSVP here.

The Travis County District Courts have issued a new standing order on motions for summary judgment, which will go into effect on June 1, 2026. Additionally, they have provided attorneys with a notice of withdrawal on motions for summary judgment template.

Attorneys licensed fewer than 10 years are invited to a lunch with Associate Court Judge Bradley Temple.

Date: Friday, July 10

Time: 12 - 1 p.m.

Location: CFCF, 1700 Guadalupe Street, 11th floor

Limited to 10 attorneys.

RSVP to delaine@austinbar.org

Attorneys licensed fewer than 10 years are invited to attend a lunch with 53rd District Court Judge Maria Cantú Hexsel.

Date: Wednesday, June 10

Time: 12 - 1 p.m.

Location: 53rd Court's jury room, CFCF, 1700 Guadalupe Street, 8th floor

Limited to 10 attorneys.

RSVP to delaine@austinbar.org

 


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