The following is a summary of selected criminal opinions issued by the Third Court of Appeals from October 2025. The summary is an overview; please review the entire opinions. The subsequent history is current as of May 11, 2026.

SEARCH WARRANTS: Requirement that affidavit be “sworn”.

State v. Chavez, 729 S.W.3d 391 (Tex. App.—Austin 2025, no pet.). Trial court did not abuse its discretion by suppressing blood-draw evidence after concluding that search-warrant affidavit was unsworn. Chavez, who was charged with a DWI offense, filed a motion to suppress blood-draw evidence obtained through a search warrant, arguing that the arresting officer’s probable-cause affidavit in support of the warrant had not been sworn or made under oath. The evidence at the hearing established that the officer completed the search warrant application inside her patrol car and electronically signed the affidavit. The affidavit was notarized by another officer, with whom the arresting officer spoke by telephone during the affidavit’s preparation. The arresting officer testified “at no time” did “anyone ever put [her] under oath” or “ask [her] if everything in any of those affidavits was true and correct.” The other officer testified that she did not place the arresting officer under oath and only “asked her to sign in the correct position stating that she was the one swearing to it.” The district court granted the motion to suppress and the appellate court affirmed. The court explained that an officer’s failure to swear to the facts in her affidavit “renders defective any search warrant issued on the basis of the unsworn probable-cause affidavit,” and that swearing an oath or affirmation is not the same as signing an affidavit. In determining the existence of a sworn oath, courts consider whether the affiant was “impressed with the magnitude of the act and whether the swearing occurred with sufficient solemnity and gravity.” In this case, the record supported the trial court’s finding that no oath or affirmation was sworn and that the circumstances surrounding the officer’s signing of the affidavit lacked solemnity and gravity. The court rejected the State’s assertion that being subject to criminal liability for perjury was a “test” for finding the existence of a sworn oath. Additionally, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because “a reasonable officer would have known that the search warrant in this case was invalid because a sworn affidavit was not filed, and there was no oath or affirmation.” Therefore, suppression was proper.  

REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS: Motions for new trial and confrontation rights.

State v. Navarro, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 03-23-00637-CR (Tex. App.—Austin 2025, pet. filed). Sixth Amendment right to confrontation did not apply to community-supervision revocation hearing. Navarro was placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision. The State later filed a motion to revoke Navarro’s community supervision and to adjudicate his guilt. The trial court granted the motion, revoked Navarro’s community supervision, and adjudicated him guilty of the offense. The trial court sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment but announced its intent to place him on “shock probation.” Navarro filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court granted. The trial court stated that it was granting a new trial because Navarro was not eligible for probation. This ground was not raised in Navarro’s motion for new trial, and the State objected to granting a new trial on that basis. 

The appellate court reversed. First, the court concluded that, because Navarro did not raise the issue of his ineligibility for shock probation in his motion for new trial, and the State objected to granting a new trial on that basis, the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial on that ground. The court then proceeded to consider the merits of the grounds raised in Navarro’s motion, including his contention that he was denied his right of confrontation. One of the State’s witnesses had testified that Navarro had missed multiple probation appointments, including one with a former probation officer who did not testify at the hearing. The witness testified to entries in Navarro’s probation records made by the officer who was unavailable to testify. Assuming without deciding that this amounted to a confrontation violation, the court held that “a deferred-adjudication community-supervision revocation hearing is not a stage in a criminal prosecution at which the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation applies.” The court explained that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals “has not determined whether the Confrontation Clause applies in hearings on motions to adjudicate guilt or to probation-revocation proceedings more broadly” and that there were significant differences between revocation proceedings and criminal trials. Because of those differences, other intermediate appellate courts had concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation did not apply to revocation hearings, and the court followed those courts.